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E-mail addresses: n.gkorogiannis@cs.ucl.ac.uk (NBetter use of biomedical knowledge is an increasingly pressing concern for tackling chal-
lenging diseases and for generally improving the quality of healthcare. The quantity of bio-
medical knowledge is enormous and it is rapidly increasing. Furthermore, in many areas it
is incomplete and inconsistent. The development of techniques for representing and rea-
soning with biomedical knowledge is therefore a timely and potentially valuable goal. In
this paper, we focus on an important and common type of biomedical knowledge that
has been obtained from clinical trials and studies. We aim for (1) a simple language for rep-
resenting the results of clinical trials and studies; (2) transparent reasoning with that
knowledge that is intuitive and understandable to users; and (3) simple computation
mechanisms with this knowledge in order to facilitate the development of viable imple-
mentations. Our approach is to propose a logical language that is tailored to the needs of
representing and reasoning with the results of clinical trials and studies. Using this logical
language, we generate arguments and counterarguments for the relative merits of treat-
ments. In this way, the incompleteness and inconsistency in the knowledge is analysed
via argumentation. In addition to motivating and formalising the logical and argumenta-
tion aspects of the framework, we provide algorithms and computational complexity
results.
 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Within many scientiﬁc ﬁelds, especially those employing imprecise measurements, statistics or imperfect modelling, it is
common for incomplete and inconsistent knowledge to arise. Medicine and more speciﬁcally the provision of healthcare, is a
prime example of such a ﬁeld with the added complication that knowledge is discovered continuously and in very high vol-
ume. For example, according to Index Medicus [15], within the last year there were approximately 1200 peer-reviewed pub-
lications in the form of reviews, meta-analyses or reports on clinical trials, on the subject of breast cancer. This information
is, of course, invaluable in medical practice, and therefore, practitioners would have to read and understand huge volumes of
information. Since this is clearly not practical, experts try to distill and reconcile the state-of-the-art published results into a
deﬁnitive and coherent form, producing systematic reviews and meta-analyses. However, these necessarily suffer from the
same weaknesses that primary publications do, i.e., that reviews and even more so meta-analyses take time to perform
and therefore lag behind the state-of-the-art they are intended to capture; and that they do not scale well with the increas-
ing rate of publication of new results, as they require a substantial amount of painstaking work by experts. For these reasons,
systems that help with summarising and analysing such volumes of information in an efﬁcient way, are appealing. Research
on constructing and studying such systems, which we will loosely call decision support systems, has been ongoing and several. All rights reserved.
. Gorogiannis), a.hunter@cs.ucl.ac.uk (A. Hunter), matt.williams@nhs.net (M. Williams).
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ments we set out later in this section.
The area that our paper focuses on is the knowledge reported by clinical trials and studies, two of the primary methods for
generating new clinical knowledge. Such publications form a signiﬁcant input to the process of delivering healthcare, either
through the setting of clinical guidelines or through directly informing the practitioner who makes healthcare-related deci-
sions. The adoption of evidence-based medicine, i.e., the increasing requirement on guiding medical practice on the basis of
the best available evidence of clinical effectiveness, makes the task of absorbing and understanding the literature even more
pressing for clinicians. To our knowledge few, if any, decision support systems provide help in this area. Our contribution is
an attempt to formalise some of the problems encountered in this process and to suggest a solution in the form of a frame-
work for reasoning about clinical studies, and for constructing arguments for and against the use of treatments with speciﬁc
patient classes and in relation to speciﬁc clinical outcome indicators.
The basic unit of knowledge in our framework is the result of a clinical study or trial. To elucidate what such a result rep-
resents, we describe in general terms how a typical (two-arm randomised) clinical trial comparing two treatments is per-
formed. A group of people conforming to well-deﬁned entry criteria (e.g., premenopausal women with post-operative
early-stage breast cancer) is sampled and that sample is randomly split into two roughly equal groups. Group one is admin-
istered treatment T1 which is usually either a form of placebo, or the treatment held as the standard of care at the time of the
trial. Group two is given treatment T2, a new treatment whose efﬁcacy against T1 the trial intends to establish. After all the
members of both groups have either been treated for a predeﬁned period of time (e.g., 5 years), or for whom a well-deﬁned
event has occurred (e.g., reappearance of disease or death), the trial ends and the efﬁcacy of the two treatments is compared
on the basis of a statistical indicator (e.g., relative risk) measuring a speciﬁc clinical outcome (e.g., disease-free survival). Be-
low, we give as an example of such a clinical study result an excerpt from [10], a report on a trial comparing two treatments
for patients with a particular kind of breast cancer.
½. . . patients with axillary lymph node-negative, estrogen receptor-positive breast cancer ½. . . chemotherapy plus tamox-
ifen resulted in signiﬁcantly better disease-free survival than tamoxifen alone (90% for methotrexate, ﬂuorouracil, and
tamoxifen (MFT) versus 85% for tamoxifen (P = .01)); ½. . .
We will return to this example in the next section.
Having a language for formally expressing such results allows the creation of repositories of results and opens up the way
for exploiting such repositories. We envisage the following ways in which such a system would be of beneﬁt.
 A clinician can easily ﬁnd publications related to a speciﬁc patient, a disease, or a treatment.
 Amedical scientist can locate areas of inconsistency within the literature and thus locate research-worthy scientiﬁc topics.
 A health authority professional can construct arguments for and against the use of a treatment, as part of an evidence-
based process of creating clinical guidelines.
 A doctor can generate argument and counter-argument structures that are useful in communicating to the patient the
pros and cons of a treatment regimen. In this way, the patient and their preferences can be more directly involved in
the decision making process.
For these beneﬁts to arise, however, any approach aiming to address the problem set out above will have to satisfy certain
requirements. We list below those requirements that we feel are essential; the list below is, of course, not exhaustive, but we
believe that the following points deserve special mention.
Simple language. The language used to express knowledge should be simple and easily understandable by the user, even
if the same knowledge can be expressed in richer, more powerful or better known formal languages.
Transparent reasoning. The complexity, uncertainty and potential conﬂicts inherent in clinical knowledge makes the
success of systems that generate a single, ‘‘correct” decision, highly unlikely. Hence, systems that analyse the available
knowledge and present the different possible results to the user, are preferable. This also leads to the requirement that
the process by which the system constructs any structure, be it an argument, set of arguments and counter-arguments, or
a logical conclusion, is simple, transparent and veriﬁable by the user.
Simple computation. As this framework is intended to be the basis of real, functional systems, and the computational
complexity of reasoning is usually high, we should aim to restrict the language as much as possible so as to allow for opti-
mising the corresponding algorithms.
These requirements have a number of consequences as to the characteristics of possible solutions. The ﬁrst and third
requirements imply a preference for a specialised and simpliﬁed language which rules out more expressive languages such
as, e.g., ﬁrst-order logic. In addition, there should be a fairly straightforward process for integrating a new piece of informa-
tion in a repository of results, allowing the scaling up of the system to a potentially large amount of data.
We also feel that the second desideratum naturally leads to systems that model domain-speciﬁc common-sense reason-
ing rather than systems that, as far as their users are concerned, ‘magically’ produce the ‘right’ answer. While a lot of clearly
signiﬁcant work exists on non-monotonic, default, paraconsistent and other logics, we feel that by aiming to represent some
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logic.
Of course, using a monotonic, credulous logic will naturally give rise to inconsistency. For the purposes of analysis, such
inconsistency is perhaps best suited to an argumentation framework, again reﬂecting how experts discuss and analyse re-
sults in order to arrive at a course of action, or a resolution of conﬂicting studies. For these reasons, we will develop an argu-
mentation system as part of our approach, that allows users to examine and analyse conﬂicting sets of clinical study results.
Argumentation is an emerging and promising research are providing methods for handling conﬂicting information (for re-
views see [7,20,5,6]).
The structure of the rest of this paper is as follows: we begin by discussing our proposed language for capturing results of
clinical studies in Section 2. Then, in Section 3 we will develop the logic hR;i that aims at representing some of the infer-
ences experts draw from such knowledge. The decidability of inference in this logic, as well as some algorithmic aspects are
examined in Section 4. An upper bound for the computational complexity of inference is presented in Section 5. Using this
logic as a basis, an argumentation system is deﬁned in Section 6, along with an examination of several decision problems and
structural properties. We conclude and discuss further avenues of study in Section 7.
2. A language for clinical trial results
To motivate our discussion of the language required for expressing clinical trial results, we will use the excerpt from [10],
presented in the previous section and shown below, as a running example. We also note here that even though the terms
clinical study and clinical trial are not equivalent, lacking a term that subsumes both we will use them interchangeably from
now on.
½. . . patients with axillary lymph node-negative, estrogen receptor-positive breast cancer ½. . . chemotherapy plus tamox-
ifen resulted in signiﬁcantly better disease-free survival than tamoxifen alone (90% for methotrexate, ﬂuorouracil, and
tamoxifen (MFT) versus 85% for tamoxifen [P = .01]); ½. . .
Clearly, the patients are the central subjects of clinical studies and therefore it is crucial to be able to describe succinctly
and unambiguously the patient class involved in a clinical trial. This requirement already enjoys widespread interest, par-
ticularly in the development and use ofmedical ontologies, such as SNOMED [17]. Such ontologies provide a language for cap-
turing patient characteristics (among other things) as well as logical machinery for answering queries such as whether one
patient class is a subset of another. Logics employed by ontologies are typically description logics, and these provide the nec-
essary inference tools (see [2] which includes a chapter on medical ontologies).
However, in the quest for computational efﬁciency, multiple description logics have been deﬁned by subtly varying their
expressiveness and, by implication, the complexity of the related decision problems. As such, choosing a particular descrip-
tion logic can be an unnecessary constraint when we want to discuss a general system in which the ontology is but one part.
For these reasons we will treat patient classes as simple sets, effectively using them as a boolean algebra. Therefore, for sim-
plicity we will use a propositional logic whose letters correspond to basic patient characteristics. Our results will be largely
generalisable to description logics as well, and we discuss this in Section 7.
Deﬁnition 1. Let LP be the language of a propositional logic with the usual connectives _;^;:;), a symbol for falsum ?,
and an inference relation ‘. The propositional letters ofLP represent patient characteristics. A patient class is any formula
/ 2LP .
We will use the lower case Greek letters /;w;v; . . . to denote patient classes from now on. We will also assume that ‘
implicitly uses as premises the knowledge available on the structure of the patient classes. So, for example, if the patient
classes /;w 2LP are disjoint (e.g., with / standing for the class of men and w for the class of women), we expect that
/ ^ w ‘?. We will also denote the length of a patient class / as j/j, and we will understand this as the number of occurrences
of propositional letters in /.
In the excerpt above, the phrase ‘‘patients with axillary lymph node-negative, estrogen receptor-positive breast cancer” delin-
eates the patient class in question. Using LN to denote ‘‘axillary lymph node-negative”, ERþ to denote ‘‘estrogen receptor-
positive” and BC to denote ‘‘breast cancer”, this patient class would be written as LN ^ ERþ ^ BC and its length would be 3.
The next component of our language is a way to denote speciﬁc treatments. Again, medical ontologies cater for this task
by providing complex categories and relationships between treatments, regimes, substances used, and other characteristics.
We would like to focus on the interrelationships between treatments and therefore, for simplicity, we will elide such com-
plexity and assume that there is a setT whose elements represent speciﬁc treatments. So, for example a course of tamox-
ifen for 5 years would be a different element ofT than a course of tamoxifen for 2 years. In the excerpt above, the phrases
‘‘methotrexate, ﬂuorouracil, and tamoxifen” and ‘‘tamoxifen”, denoted as MFT and TAM, respectively, would be elements ofT.
Note that even though the excerpt does not make this explicit, these are speciﬁc treatments with speciﬁc dosage, regime,
duration, etc.
We also need to represent the criteria of comparison used in a clinical trial (see, e.g. [8] for details on the statistical meth-
ods employed in clinical trials). Results from clinical trials compare treatments in terms of clinical outcome indicators.
These are statistical measures aiming to encompass an important aspect of the effect of the treatment. In the example,
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ease-free after a ﬁxed period of time, usually 5 years. We will assume that there is a set COI of clinical outcome indicators,
and in the example DFS 2 COI would denote disease-free survival.
Finally, we need a way to capture the result of the comparison. Such comparisons can be very information-rich, as is the
case in the excerpt above: ‘‘90% for methotrexate, ﬂuorouracil, and tamoxifen (MFT) versus 85% for tamoxifen [P = .01]”. Here, the
percentages of patients for disease-free survival are presented with respect to the treatment administered, accompanied by a
P value, which is a statistical indicator of how reliable the result of the comparison is. We would like to focus on qualitative
comparisons, thereby simplifying the available information, but also aiming to capture a common-sense way of reasoning
with it. To this end, we allow for two possibilities for the comparison of two treatments T1; T2 2T in terms of the clinical
outcome indicator I 2 COI used:
 One treatment, say T1, is unambiguously (i.e., statistically signiﬁcantly) better than T2 with respect to I. We will represent
this as T1>IT2.
 The trial was unable to show statistically signiﬁcant differences between the two treatments with respect to I. We denote
this by T1IT2 (which will be treated as equivalent to T2IT1).
Therefore, we deﬁne these formulae as follows:
Deﬁnition 2. Let T1; T2 2T be distinct treatments ðT1–T2Þ and I 2 COI. Then, any formula of the form T1>IT2 or of the form
T1IT2 is a treatment comparison formula. The set of all treatment comparison formulae will be denoted by TF.
We should note that the failure of a study to demonstrate superiority of one treatment over another, when interpreted in
a strict statistical sense means that there is no evidence to suggest superiority as opposed to the common-sense interpretation
that there is evidence of equivalence. A corollary of the strict statistical interpretation is that we should not be encoding non-
statistically signiﬁcant results at all. However, many clinicians are interested in inferences that could be drawn from the
common-sense interpretation of such results, even though strictly speaking incorrect, e.g., when a clinical trial employing
a very large number of patients yields a statistically insigniﬁcant result. For these reasons we adopt an agnostic approach
where encoding and reasoning with such knowledge is allowed but not enforced.
Putting all these components together, we deﬁne the language R as follows:
Deﬁnition 3. Let / be a patient class and t a treatment comparison formula. Then, the languageR consists of any formula of
the form / ! t. A rule is any formula a 2 R.
Note that we call such formulae rules, reﬂecting the common-sense interpretation that if a patient belongs to the patient
class / and a trial has concluded / ! t, then this result is relevant to this patient. From now on we will use the lower case
Greek letters a; b; c; . . . to denote rules, and upper case roman letters A;B;C; . . . to denote ﬁnite subsets of R. Using this lan-
guage, the result reported in the excerpt from [10] would be encoded as follows:1 The
such caLN ^ ERþ ^ BC ! MFT>DFSTAM
For reasons that will become apparent in the next sections, we will visualise a set of rules using a labelled graph where the
nodes are the treatments and the edges correspond to rules and are labelled by the patient class of the associated rule. Below
is the graph for the rule above.MFT !LNþ^ERþ^BC TAM
We will also deﬁne the length of a rule / ! t as the length of its patient class, i.e., jaj ¼ j/j. We do this since the length of
any treatment comparison formula is constant. The number of elements of a set S is denoted by jSj and the total length of a
set of rules A is deﬁned to be the sum of the lengths of all formulae in A, and denoted by kAk.
This language allows for expressing judgements of the type ‘‘for patient class /, treatment T1 is better than treatment T2
with respect to clinical outcome indicator I”. However, judgements involving different clinical outcome indicators are
orthogonal and cannot interact in any way.1 Therefore, for simplicity, we will assume that any given set of rules contains rules
referring to the same clinical outcome indicator. If this is not the case, it is trivial to split the set in question into subsets where
this condition holds. Then, each subset can be treated separately. For these reasons we will also omit the notation for clinical
outcome indicators entirely.
A ﬁnal observation is that there is no negation in R. The main reason behind this is that clinical studies, generally, report
positive results or their absence, none of which is equivalent to the negation of a positive result. In other words, normally a
study cannot conclude that for the patient class /, treatment T1 is not better than treatment T2, without at the same time
concluding something stronger, i.e., that treatment T2 is better than T1, or that there is no signiﬁcant evidence for either com-
parison. For these reasons and in order not to introduce something that would invalidate our desideratum about a simplere can be interactions due to integrity constraints inherent in the meaning of the clinical outcome indicators. However, for simplicity, we will ignore
ses.
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conﬂicts.
3. A logic for clinical knowledge
Having deﬁned a language for encoding the results of clinical trials, we are now able to approach the second desideratum
which is the ability to reason with such results. Given a set of rules that represents a set of clinical trial results, the intention
is to provide a way to construct the intuitive consequences of that set. We emphasise that we aim to deﬁne a simple, cred-
ulous logic, since we do not want to restrict ourselves only to the statistically valid inferences, which would be impossible to
generate at this level of abstraction. Instead, we aim to capture some of the common-sense reasoning that clinicians employ,
especially in the absence of directly relevant, statistically valid, results. To this end, we deﬁne an entailment relation  on the
language R. We will do this by setting out inference rules that capture an appropriate notion of consequence.
The ﬁrst inference rule captures equivalence of rewriting treatment comparison formulas involving , and is
straightforward./ ! T1  T2
/ ! T2  T1 EQThe ﬁrst non-trivial inference rule we propose is one of specialisation. The motivation behind this inference rule comes from
the process by which a doctor decides which of the available results are relevant to a patient to be treated. The patient could
be potentially described as belonging to a patient class / which includes all the observed characteristics. If there is no result
that directly references the patient class / then it is usual to consider as potential candidates all results whose patient class is
a superclass of /. We will, therefore, formalise this principle in the following inference rule.w ! t
/ ! t SP ðgiven / ‘ wÞIt can be easily seen that this inference rule will easily lead to contradictory results given a large enough rule set. To see this,
suppose that a patient belongs to the patient class / and that we have obtained the following results:w ! T1 > T2 v ! T2 > T1
where / ‘ w and / ‘ v. Using SP we can infer both / ! T1 > T2 and / ! T2 > T1, an intuitively contradictory statement.
We will indeed deﬁne such situations as contradictory in Section 6, but we will refrain from trying to guess which rule is the
‘right’ one, a task which has been studied in the literature (e.g. [3]) and is related to the speciﬁcity principle, i.e., that if we
know that v ‘ w then we should conclude / ! T1 > T2 and not / ! T2 > T1. The reason we do not follow this line of en-
quiry is that (a) it would yield a non-monotonic logic which we have ruled out in our list of desiderata in Section 1 and (b)
there are cases where a clinician would decide in favour of the more ‘general’ rule, i.e., v ! T2 > T1, e.g., if they believe that
the clinical study resulting in this rule is somehow more credible or reliable than the one providing the other rule. One such
occurrence that is common has to do with the statistical power of the clinical study, which is related to the number of
participants.
Another important inference rule is disjunction introduction which can be thought of as the dual of specialisation. The
motivation behind it is that if the same result has been obtained by comparing two treatments on two different patient clas-
ses, then it is reasonable to expect that the same holds for the union of the two patient classes./ ! t w ! t
/ _ w ! t DIFinally, it is reasonable to expect that given a set of results on the same patient class, we can use transitivity to infer rela-
tionships between treatments. For example, if we know that / ! T1 > T2 and / ! T2 > T3 then we could infer that
/ ! T1 > T3. This deductive process is an abstraction of the reasoning used in the following example. Suppose that for a
patient class / suffering from a particular disease, there exists a treatment that is accepted as the standard of care, say
T2. Treatment T2 has been tested in the past against placebo, T3, and has been established as better according to some out-
come, i.e., / ! T2 > T3. A new treatment T1 is being trialled against T2 and it turns out that it performs better, i.e.,
/ ! T1 > T2. Now, in the case where the disease in question is very serious, it is not ethical to perform a trial comparing
T1 against placebo, since then an inferior treatment (i.e., no treatment) would be knowingly given to patients of the disease.
Therefore, we cannot possibly know directly whether / ! T1 > T3, and yet we infer from the two separate trials that this is
indeed the case.
We formalise the transitivity inference rule below. Since we use two relations, > and , we obtain a set of four inference
rules./ ! T1 > T2 / ! T2 > T3
/ ! T1 > T3
/ ! T1 > T2 / ! T2  T3
/ ! T1 > T3
/ ! T1  T2 / ! T2 > T3
/ ! T1 > T3
/ ! T1  T2 / ! T2  T3
/ ! T1  T3
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we will refer to the following inference rule as the transitivity rule, encompassing all four of the above possibilities./ ! T1  T2 / ! T2  T3
/ ! T1}T3 TROf course, } must represent a symbol in accordance with  and , as above.
We should point out that specialisation, disjunction introduction and transitivity are inference rules that do not necessar-
ily draw statistically valid inferences. The reason is that the presence of a confounding variable in the patient samples involved
can invalidate the conclusion. By way of example, consider a clinical trial result of the form / ! T1 > T2 and a patient class
w such that w ‘ /, thereby allowing the application of the specialisation rule. However, it could be that the relative sizes of
the populations of / and w are so different such that almost no patient of w took part in the trial on the patient class /. This
means that it is actually possible that w ! T2 > T1, or that w ! T1  T2 is the case. Similar arguments exist for disjunction
introduction and transitivity (see, e.g. [4]). As explained earlier, consequences derived using these inference rules are defea-
sible conclusions, intended to allow users to ﬁnd potential ramiﬁcations of clinical study results.
For simplicity, whenever we apply an inference rule we will allow in-place rewriting of the patient class in the con-
clusion to any ‘-equivalent one, as illustrated in Example 1. This is equivalent to applying SP after a given inference
rule.
Having set out these inference rules, we can deﬁne entailment.
Deﬁnition 4. A proof of a rule a from a set of rules A is a ﬁnite sequence of rules a1; . . . ;an such that an ¼ a and for any i 6 n
either ai 2 A, or there exist an inference rule and an index j < i (in the case of SP and EQ), or indices j; k < i (in the case of DI
and TR) such that applying the rule in question to aj, or to aj; ak, respectively, yields ai.
Using the notion of proof we deﬁne entailment.
Deﬁnition 5. Rule entailment is a relation #2R R, deﬁned as follows:
A  a iff there exists a proof of a from ALet A;B;C be sets of rules. We generalise  to a relation between sets of rules in the obvious way: A  B iff for all b 2 B it is
the case that A  b. It is trivial to show that this relation is transitive, i.e., if A  B and B  C then A  C. It is also reﬂexive, i.e.,
A  A, and monotonic in the sense that if A  B then it is also the case that C  B for any C  A.
Two rules a; b 2 R are equivalentwhenever it is the case that a  b and b  a. Two sets of rules A;B are equivalent if A  B
and B  A. It is evident that two rules are equivalent precisely when each one can be derived from the other by application of
EQ and SP only.
In what follows, a structure that functions as a witness for rule entailment that is different to that of a proof, will be use-
ful. This structure is a proof tree.
Deﬁnition 6. Let A be a set of rules and a a rule. A proof tree for a on A is a tree structure whose leaves are members of A,
and its internal nodes represent applications of the inference rules, yielding a new rule as a consequence. The consequence of
the root node is a.
It should be clear that A  a iff there is a proof tree for a on A.
Example 1. Let A be the following set of rules (left) and its corresponding graph (right). P and Q are patient characteristics,
i.e., propositional letters in LP .We demonstrate a proof for A  P ! T1 > T3Note the use of in-place rewriting of the patient class in the application of DI, i.e., the use of the fact that
‘ ðP ^ :QÞ _ ðP ^ QÞ () P in rewriting the conclusion of the application of DI accordingly.
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We have effectively deﬁned a simple, monotonic logic hR;i that, by applying inference rules that reﬂect important ways
of common-sense reasoning employed by clinicians, can be used for working out the consequences of a given set of rules. The
obvious next step is to look at this logic from an algorithmic viewpoint. We will call RULE-ENTAILMENT the decision problem
of ascertaining whether it is the case that A  a. In other words if A is a ﬁnite set of rules and a is a rule, a yes-instance for
RULE-ENTAILMENT is a pair A;a if A  a and a no-instance otherwise.
Proposition 7. RULE-ENTAILMENT is decidable.
Proof. Assuming that there are p propositional letters inLP , we obtain that there are 2
p ‘-equivalence classes ofLP formu-
lae. By ﬁxing an arbitrary representative formula for each ‘-equivalence class (effectively a canonical normal form) any
patient class can be rewritten in this normal form. Let the function that rewrites a patient class into its normal form be 	N .
Given a ﬁnite set of treatmentsT, there are at most n ¼ 2p 	 jTj2 	 2 many -equivalence classes of rules. A normal form
for rules clearly exists, extending the propositional one. We will denote the set of -equivalence classes by RN and extend
the function 	N to rules and sets of rules. We can modify the inference rules given previously so that the conclusion is always
rewritten in normal form, obtaining N , a new entailment relation. Clearly, A  a iff AN N aN .
Given a ﬁnite set of rules A, there is only a ﬁnite number of non-repeating sequences of rules from AN since the maximum
length of such a sequence cannot be greater than jRN j ¼ n. Any such sequence can be checked as to whether it constitutes a
proof of aN for some rule a. Therefore, checking whether AN N aN is decidable, and thus, so is checking whether A  a. h
Since RULE-ENTAILMENT is decidable, it is reasonable to enquire about what algorithms can be constructed for it, as well
as about its computational complexity. To address these questions we will focus on proof trees as witnesses of entailment
rather than proofs, and on their properties. To this end, we will deﬁne special forms of proof trees and show that if a proof
tree exists, then a proof tree of a particular form also exists. We start with the notion of an ordered proof tree.
Deﬁnition 8. A proof tree is bf ordered iff in every branch from the root to the leaves, the sequence of applications of
inference rules consists of:
1. Zero or more DI nodes, followed by,
2. zero or more TR nodes, followed by,
3. zero or one SP node, followed by,
4. zero or one EQ node.Example 2. Returning to Example 1, we can see that there is an ordered proof tree for P ! T1 > T3 on A. We recall
that:Then, the following ordered proof tree for P ! T1 > T3 on A exists.In this case, an ordered proof tree exists. The natural question to ask is whether this is always the case. The following result
addresses this question.
Proposition 8. An ordered proof tree for a on A exists iff A  a.
Proof. The left-to-right direction is obvious. For the other direction, we prove the desired result by showing that applica-
tions of inference rules commute in certain directions. Thus, an arbitrary proof tree for a on A can be rewritten into an
ordered one. We start by showing that EQ can be ‘‘pushed down” towards the leaves.
Suppose A ¼ fw ! T2T1g, and that / ‘ w. Then the following proof tree on the left can be rewritten as the one on the
right.w ! T2  T1
/ ! T2  T1 SP
/ ! T1  T2 EQ
w ! T2  T1
w ! T1  T2 EQ
/ ! T1  T2 SP
8 N. Gorogiannis et al. / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 51 (2009) 1–22Suppose A ¼ f/ ! T2  T1;w ! T2  T1g. Again, the proof tree on the left can be replaced by the one on the right.
/ ! T2  T1 w ! T2  T1
/ _ w ! T2  T1
/ _ w ! T1  T2 EQ
DI
/ ! T2  T1
/ ! T1  T2 EQ
w ! T2  T1
w ! T1  T2 EQ
/ _ w ! T1  T2 DIFinally, consider A ¼ f/ ! T3  T2;/ ! T2  T1g. The proof tree on the left can be rewritten as the one on the right.
/ ! T3  T2 / ! T2  T1
/ ! T3  T1
/ ! T1  T3 EQ
TR
/ ! T3  T2
/ ! T2  T3 EQ
/ ! T2  T1
/ ! T1  T2 EQ
/ ! T1  T3 TRAlso, it is easy to see that any branch consisting exclusively of applications of EQ can be simpliﬁed to one of length at most
one. At this stage, we have shown that a proof tree can be transformed into one where at most one application of EQ appears
only at the end of each root-to-leaves branch.
Next, we show that SP can be ‘‘pushed down” over TR and DI. Suppose A ¼ fw ! T1 > T2;w ! T2 > T3g and that / ‘ w.
Then the following proof trees are equivalent.w ! T1 > T2 w ! T2 > T3
w ! T1 > T3
/ ! T1 > T3 SP
TR
w ! T1 > T2
/ ! T1 > T2 SP
w ! T2 > T3
/ ! T2 > T3 SP
/ ! T1 > T3 TRThe remaining combinations of > and  allowed by TR are handled in an identical manner.
Similarly, suppose that A ¼ fw ! t;v ! tg for some treatment comparison formula t and that / ‘ w _ v. Then, the
following proof trees for / ! t on A are equivalent, given that from / ‘ w _ v and propositional logic we can show that
‘ /() ðð/ ^ wÞ _ ð/ ^ vÞÞ.Note the use of re-writing of a patient class in a logically equivalent one.
These cases demonstrate that applications of SP can be ‘‘pushed down” below applications of DI and TR. Also, any branch
consisting of SP nodes can be transformed into one with only a single application of SP, due to the transitivity of ‘. At this
stage we have shown that an arbitrary proof tree can be transformed into one where on any root-to-leaves branch one
encounters applications of TR and DI, followed by at most one application of SP, followed by at most one application of EQ.
Finally, we show that TR can be ‘‘pushed down” over DI. Let A be as follows.A ¼ f/ ! T1 > T2; w ! T1 > T2; / ^ w ! T2 > T3g
Consider the following proof tree for / ^ w ! T1 > T3 on A.We can construct the following proof tree for / ^ w ! T1 > T3 on A.Again, other combinations of > and  are identical. Note that the new occurrences of SP can be dealt with as previously
noted. This completes the proof. h
Now that we have proved that A  a iff an ordered proof tree for a on A exists, we can make several observations on such
proof trees. First we note that, since disjunction introduction applications are found only at the top of the proof tree, their
effect is equivalent to constructing a single, long disjunction, which is also the consequence of the proof tree. This observation
leads us to deﬁne a new inference rule that will replace all such applications of DI. We call this new rule DI-n, since it is an n-
ary version of DI./1 ! t 	 	 	/n ! tWn
i¼1/i ! t
DI-nIt should be clear that DI-n is sound in the sense that any application of DI-n can be replaced by several applications of DI.
The second observation on ordered proof trees is that applications of TR are also grouped together at the top of each
sub-tree hanging off a disjunction introduction node. Clearly, each such sub-tree corresponds to a kind of path on the
N. Gorogiannis et al. / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 51 (2009) 1–22 9set of treatments. We formalise this intuitive notion here, which will be useful in what follows. Before doing that,
we will deﬁne a function Tr that returns the set of treatments employed in a ﬁnite sequence of rules (below,  stands
for > or ).Trðh/ ! T1  T2iÞ ¼ fT1; T2g for any / 2LP and distinct T1; T2 2T
Trðha1; . . . ;an;anþ1iÞ ¼ Trðha1; . . . ;aniÞ [ Trðhanþ1iÞfor n P 1Deﬁnition 10. Let S be a ﬁnite sequence of rules and Ts; Te two treatments. We will say that S is a simple path from Ts to Te
(and write SPðS; Ts; TeÞ) iff S is a simple -path from Ts to Te, or S is a simple >-path from Ts to Te.
We deﬁne inductively whether a sequence S is a simple -path from Ts to Te (written SPðS; Ts; TeÞ).SPðhai; Ts; TeÞ iff
a ¼ / ! Ts  Te or
a ¼ / ! Te  Ts

SPðha1; . . . ;an;anþ1i; Ts; TeÞ iff
Te R Trðha1; . . . ;aniÞ and 9Tm s:t:
SPðhanþ1i; Tm; TeÞ and;
SPðha1; . . . ;ani; Ts; TmÞ
8><
>:We also deﬁne inductively whether a sequence S is a simple >-path from Ts to Te, written SP>ðS; Ts; TeÞ.
SP>ðhai; Ts; TeÞ iff a ¼ / ! Ts > Te
SP>ðha1; . . . ;an;anþ1i; Ts; TeÞ iff
Te R Trðha1; . . . ;aniÞ and 9Tm s:t:
SP>ðhanþ1i; Tm; TeÞ and;
SPðha1; . . . ;ani; Ts; TmÞ
or;
SPðhanþ1i; Tm; TeÞ and;
SP>ðha1; . . . ;ani; Ts; TmÞ
8>>>>><
>>>>:Finally, we will say that a sequence of rules S is a simple path (respectively simple -path or simple >-path) whenever
there exist treatments Ts; Te such that S is a simple path from Ts to Te (respectively simple -path from Ts to Te or simple
>-path from Ts to Te).
Note that this deﬁnition allows the starting and ending treatments to be the same, but forbids repetition of treatments
within the path. Since no cycling is allowed inside a path there is only one way to order a set of rules into a path when the
start and end treatments are designated. We will make use of this fact and somewhat abuse notation by treating simple
paths as sequences but also as sets of rules.
Example 3. Consider the following set of rules A0.Note that we indicate the use of  with a dashed, non-directed edge, in agreement with the interpretation of .
It is easy to see that h:Q ! T2  T3i is a simple -path from T2 to T3 and that hP ! T1 > T2; P ^ Q ! T2 > T3i and
hP ! T1 > T2;:Q ! T2  T3i are both simple >-paths from T1 to T3.
Now we can return to our earlier observation and reﬁne it. We can see that the use of applications of transitivity in or-
dered proof trees effectively corresponds to transitively inferring a rule on the basis of a simple path. Then, intuitively, the
application of SP and EQ serves the purpose of transforming the original rules so that TR can be applied consecutively, build-
ing up a simple path. We deﬁne the following inference rule, which we call compound transitivity and denote it by CTR-n, and
show how this rule captures exactly this process,/1 ! T11T 01 	 	 	/n ! TnnT 0nVn
i¼1/i ! T1  T 0n
CTR-nwhere the sequence S ¼ h/1 ! T11T 01; . . . ;/n ! TnnT 0ni forms a simple -path from T1 to T 0n, i.e., if S forms a simple >-path
then  will stand for >, otherwise  will stand for .
Proposition 11. The compound transitivity rule is sound.
Proof. Suppose S ¼ h/1 ! T11T 01; . . . ;/n ! TnnT 0ni forms a simple -path from T1 to T 0n. For simplicity, we will assume
that T 0i ¼ Tiþ1 for i < n so that applying EQ is not necessary. Then, we can construct the following proof tree.
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that the application of CTR-n is sound in this case.
It should also be easy to see that relaxing the assumption that T 0i ¼ Tiþ1 for i < n does not affect the soundness of CTR-n:
indeed, it would at most necessitate the introduction of applications of EQ in the proof tree at the appropriate points just
before the application of SP. h
By using DI-n and CTR-n instead of DI and TR we can deﬁne a new kind of proof tree that will lead us to a characterisation
result as well as a complexity result for rule entailment. This form of proof tree we call n-ordered and is as follows.
Deﬁnition 12. A proof tree is called n-ordered iff on any branch from the root to the leaves, there is at most one application
of inference rules in the following order: SP, DI-n, CTR-n.
Example 4. Continuing our runningexample,weshowthat there is ann-orderedproof tree forP ! T1 > T3 onA.We recall thatA ¼ fP ! T1 > T2; P ^ Q ! T2 > T3; :Q ! T2 > T3gThen, the following n-ordered proof tree for P ! T1 > T3 on A exists.Similarly to the case of ordered proof trees, we can ask the question of whether an n-ordered proof tree exists whenever
an arbitrary proof tree exists. The following proposition settles this question.
Proposition 13. There exists an n-ordered proof tree for a on A iff A  a.
Proof. The left-to-right direction is obvious. For the other direction, we ﬁrst obtain the corresponding ordered tree by Prop-
osition 8.
Let A be a set of rules such that a proof tree for a rule w ! Ts  Te on A exists in which any branch from the root to the
leaves contains one or more TR nodes followed by at most one EQ node, and then followed by at most one SP node. It should
then be clear that a permutation of a subset of A forms a simple -path from Ts to Te. Let this sequence of rules be
h/1 ! T11T 01; . . . ;/n ! TnnT 0ni, with T1 ¼ Ts and T 0n ¼ Te (if the ﬁrst or last rule employs  then it could be that T 01 ¼ Ts or
Tn ¼ Te, but for simplicity and without loss of generality we will assume the former pair of equations). Note also that
applications of SP must specialise all /i to the same patient class w for TR to be applicable, and therefore it must be that
w ‘ /i for all i 6 n. This means we can construct the following proof tree on A./1 ! T11T 01 	 	 	/n ! TnnT 0nV
i6n/i ! T1  T 0n
w ! Ts  Te SP
CTR-nThis is sound because w ‘ /i for all i 6 n entails that w ‘
V
i6n/i. By applying this result to an ordered proof tree, we can trans-
form it to one that on any of its branches, one encounters from the root to the leaves, one or more DI nodes, at most one SP
node and at most one CTR-n node.
We then prove that specialisation can be ‘‘pushed up” this transformed proof tree over DI. Suppose that we have the proof
tree on the left and that / ‘ v. Then we can construct the proof tree on the right, given that / ‘ v entails / ^ w ‘ v ^ w.Finally, we can merge successive applications of SP into a single application, as well as replace successive applications of DI
with a single DI-n node. This completes the proof. h
This result establishes the completeness of SP, DI-n and CTR-n with respect to the original inference rules. It also ad-
dresses an algorithmic issue related to the application of SP: in effect, SP is an inference rule that can yield multiple, different
consequences if applied repeatedly to the same premise. This amounts to a non-deterministic choice of a consequence in
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of SP, the one at the top of the proof tree, we have ﬁxed both the premises as well as the required consequence of the appli-
cation of SP, avoiding in this way the non-deterministic choice.
A notational convenience we will use relates to the patient class appearing in the consequence of the application of CTR-
n: let S ¼ h/1 ! t1; . . . ;/n ! tni be a simple path; we call
V
i6n/i the patient class of S and denote it by PCS.
The following result characterises rule entailment on the basis of the existence of simple paths.
Theorem 14. Let A be a set of rules and / ! Ts  Te a rule. Then,
A  / ! Ts  Te iff /‘
W
S2P
PCS where
P ¼ fS#AjS is a simple -path from Ts to TegProof. From Proposition 13 we know that A  / ! Ts  Te iff there is a n-ordered proof tree for / ! Ts  Te on A. By Def-
inition 12, we know that there is a set P of simple -paths from Ts to Te, namely the premises of applications of CTR-n. The
patient class of each such simple -path is PCS for S 2 P, again by the deﬁnition of CTR-n. The application of DI-n collects all
these patient classes into
W
S2PPCS ! Ts  Te, and ﬁnally, the application of SP requires that / ‘
W
S2PPCS. h
Having obtained Theorem 14, we are in a position to develop an algorithm for -entailment, by searching through all pos-
sible simple paths between the treatments in the query formula within a set of premises.
Algorithm 1. A ? / ! Ts  Te.
w  ?
for all simple -paths S from Ts to Te in A do
w  w _ PCS
if / ‘ w then
return yes
end if
end for
return noTheorem 15. Algorithm 1 is sound and complete.
Proof. With respect to soundness, it should be clear that Algorithm 1, whenever it returns a positive answer, it does so hav-
ing checked conditions witnessing the existence of a proof tree of the form delineated in Proposition 13. Conversely, with
respect to completeness, Proposition 13 establishes that A  a iff there is a proof tree of the appropriate form for a on A. Algo-
rithm 1 clearly searches all such proof trees. h5. The complexity of rule entailment
We can now turn to the complexity of rule entailment. We recall that the classPp2 of the polynomial hierarchy [21,14] can
be deﬁned in terms of oracle Turing Machines as follows. Given a complexity class C, a C-oracle can be thought of as a sub-
routine that can decide any decision problem in C in constant time. A C-oracle TuringMachine is a TuringMachine thatmakes
queries to a C-oracle during its execution. The class of all decision problems decidable in the complexity class D by a C-oracle
Turing Machine is denoted by DC. Therefore, if, for example, a Turing Machine exists that decides a problem A in polynomial
time given access to a NP-oracle, then A 2 PNP. Then, the classPp2 can be deﬁned as the complement of the class of problems
decidable in non-deterministic polynomial time given access to a NP-oracle, or in other words, Pp2 ¼ coNPNP.
Proposition 16. RULE-ENTAILMENT is in Pp2.
Proof. Let A ¼ fbi ¼ /i ! TiiT 0iji 6 ng be a set of rules and let also a ¼ w ! Ts  Te. We want to decide whether A  a. The
size of the input is linear in kAk þ jwj.
From Theorem 14, we know that:A  w ! Ts  Te iff w ‘
_
S2P
PCSwhere P stands for the set of all simple -paths from Ts to Te in A. We will use p1; . . . ; pk to denote the propositional letters of
the language of patient classesLP . Note that for a given set of rules A we need up to kAk propositional letters, thus k 6 kAk.
We can then rewrite the right-hand part as follows, denoting by M a valuation on p1; . . . ; pk.8M; if M 
 w; then 9S 2 P; such that M 
 PCS
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 w; then 9B#A s:t: B is a simple  -path from Ts to Te and M 
 PCB:
First we show that given a valuation M and a set of rules B#A,B is a simple  -path from Ts to Te and M 
 PCB ðÞ
can be checked in time polynomial in kAk. It is well known that given a valuationM and a formula v, checking whetherM 
 v
takes at most polynomial time in the sizes of M and v. Also, note that for any B#A it is the case that jPCBj 6 kAk, and recall
that k 6 kAk. Thus, checking M 
 PCB takes at most polynomial time in kAk.
Moreover, given a set of rules B#A, we can check whether B constitutes a simple -path from Ts to Te in time polynomial
in jBj, akin to checking whether a set of edges in a graph constitutes a path between two given vertices. Since jBj 6 jAj, this
establishes that (*) can be checked in polynomial time in kAk.
Therefore, given a valuationM, we can check whether there exists B#A that satisﬁes (*) in non-deterministic polynomial
time (in kAk). Recall once again that checkingM 
 v can be checking in time polynomial in kAk þ jwj. Thus, checking whether
for any valuation M that satisﬁes w there exists a set of rules B#A as above, is in coNPNP (in kAk þ jwj), completing the
proof. h6. Argumentation with clinical knowledge
We have seen how the logic hR;i allows the drawing of inferences from a set of rules that, while not necessarily statis-
tically valid, are intended to reﬂect the ways experts might reason with clinical knowledge. Such inferences may help us to
understand incomplete sets of rules, but may not help when such sets are inconsistent. In this context, argumentation can
help in identifying the pros and cons of such inferences, in the form of arguments and counter-arguments. Therefore, in this
section we will (a) deﬁne an argumentation system, (b) investigate notions of attacks between arguments, (c) examine the
complexity of some relevant decision problems, and (d) show how notions of defeasible inference from the argumentation
literature such as warrant, can be deﬁned within this framework.
We have already noted that there is no negation in R, and that one of our aims is to employ R within an argumentation
approach, which obviously rests upon a notion of conﬂict. Without negation, this notion needs to be explicitly deﬁned and
we do this now. We deﬁne contradiction, a symmetric relation between subsets of R, i.e., ﬄ #2R  2R, as follows.
Deﬁnition 17. Two sets A;B#R are contradictory, denoted as A ﬄ B, whenever there exist a consistent patient class
/ð/ 0 ?) and two treatment comparison formulae f ; g such that A  / ! f ;B  / ! g and for some T1; T2 2T, it is the
case that:
 f ¼ T1 > T2 and g ¼ T2 > T1, or
 f ¼ T1 > T2 and g ¼ T1  T2, or g ¼ T2  T1.Whenever the sets involved are singletons we will omit the set delimiters, e.g., if fag ﬄ fbg we will write a ﬄ b. A single
set of rules A is called contradictory iff A ﬄ A.
Example 5. Consider the following set of rules B, extending the set A we have seen in previous examples.It should be clear that B  P ! T1 > T3 and, by the last rule in B;B  P ! T3 > T1. Therefore, B is contradictory.
Proposition 18. Checking whether a1 ﬄ a2 is NP-complete.
Proof. NP-hardness is immediate by reducing propositional satisﬁability of w to checking whether ðw ! T1 > T2Þ ﬄ ð> !
p ! T2 > T1Þ.
Let a1 ¼ /1 ! f 1;a2 ¼ /2 ! f 2 be two rules. According to the deﬁnition they are contradictory iff there is a patient class
w and treatment comparison formulae g1; g2 such that a1  w ! g1 and a2  w ! g2 and g1; g2 are as in Deﬁnition 17.
Clearly, only EQ and SP can be used for proving these entailments. Only the application of EQ affects the treatment
comparison formulae, and it should be clear that a constant-time check is enough to ascertain whether from f1 and f2 one can
derive appropriate formulae g1; g2 that satisfy Deﬁnition 17. In order to apply SP we need to check that w ‘ /1 and w ‘ /2, so
it sufﬁces to check whether /1 ^ /2 0 ?, as the most general specialisation of /1 and /2. This establishes that checking
whether a1 ﬄ a2 is within NP. h
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satisﬁability. By extension, we pose the question of how we can check whether a set of rules is contradictory. In a sense, the
following deﬁnition in relation to contradiction mirrors that of Deﬁnition 10 in relation to entailment, and it will provide us
with a means to the desired algorithm.
Deﬁnition 19. A set of rules A is a simple >-cycle iff there exists a treatment T0 such that all the members of A can be
arranged into a simple >-path S from T0 to T0 with PCS 0 ?.
Example 6. The set of rules B is as follows:It can be seen that fP ! T1 > T2;:Q ! T2 > T3; P ! T3 > T1g is a simple >-cycle on account of the fact that P ^ :Q is
consistent.
As before, it is reasonable to enquire whether the existence of a cycle within a set is equivalent to that set being contra-
dictory. The following proposition shows that this is the case.
Proposition 20. A set of rules A is contradictory iff there is a subset B#A such that B is a simple >-cycle.
Proof. Right-to-left: by assumption there is a treatment T0 2T such that B can be arranged into a sequence h/1 ! f 1; . . . ;
/n ! f ni that forms a simple >-path from T0 to T0. Let S ¼ h/1 ! f 1; . . . ;/n1 ! f n1i (it is clear that for the premise to be
true n must be greater than 1). By Deﬁnition 19 it follows that
V
i6n/i 0 ?. By Deﬁnition 10, there are two cases:
1. either S is a simple path from T0 to some treatment Tn and h/n ! f ni is a simple >-path from Tn to T0,
2. or, S is a simple >-path from T0 to some treatment Tn and h/n ! f ni is a simple -path from Tn to T0.In all cases, by applying SP to /n ! f n we obtain
V
i6n/i ! f n.
In case (1), the application of CTR-n on S yields either
V
i<n/i ! T0 > Tn or
V
i<n/i ! T0  Tn, and both rules can be
specialised to
V
i6n/i ! T0 > Tn or
V
i6n/i ! T0  Tn respectively. Clearly, fn must be equal to Tn > T0 and this completes
the proof for this case.
In case (2), applying CTR-n on S yields
V
i<n/i ! T0 > Tn which can be specialised to
V
i6n/i ! T0 > Tn. But then fn must
be equal to Tn  T0 or to T0  Tn and in either cases we have a contradiction.
Left-to-right: by assumption, A ﬄ A, which in turn means that there exist a patient class v and distinct treatments
T1; T2 2T such that A  v ! T1  T2;A  v ! T2  T1 and ;  stand for a combination that makes these two rules
contradictory. Consider the two ordered proof trees obtained as in Proposition 8. Let /1; . . . ;/n and w1; . . . ;wm be the patient
classes that the specialisation rules result in, in the two proof trees. By the structure of the proof trees and the assumptions
above, it follows that ‘ v() Wi6n/i and ‘ v() Wj6mwj, hence ‘ Wi6n/i () Wj6mwj. Therefore, it must be that there exist
k 6 n and l 6 m such that /k ^ wl 0 ?, since v 0 ?. The indices k and l correspond to two sub-trees of the two proof trees that
only contain applications of TR, SP and EQ,with leaves B; C#A, respectively, such that B  /k ! T1  T2 and C  wl ! T2  T1.
It should then be clear that B [ C can be arranged into a simple >-path from T1 to T1, thus completing the proof. h
Proposition 20 implicitly points at an algorithm for checking whether a set of rules is contradictory. By examining this
link we can conclude that the complexity of this decision problem turns out to be potentially lower than that of entailment,
as the next result shows.
Proposition 21. Let A be a set of rules. Checking whether A is contradictory is NP-complete.
Proof. Proof of NP-hardness is implied by Proposition 18. We show membership of the problem in NP by supplying a non-
deterministic polynomial time algorithm. Given Proposition 20, in order to check whether A is contradictory we can check
whether A contains a simple >-cycle. To do that, one needs to non-deterministically guess a subset of A, check that it is a path
from a treatment to itself, and check the consistency of its patient classes. This is possible by:
1. non-deterministically guessing a valuation M for LP , a subset B#A and a treatment T0,
2. checking whether B is a simple >-path from T0 to T0,
3. and checking whether M 
 PCB.
As we have argued earlier, steps 2 and 3 can be performed in polynomial time in kAk, and therefore the problem is in
NP. h
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any of their members would make them non-contradictory.
Therefore, and in anticipation of constructing counter-arguments, we may ask if it is the case that aminimal contradictory
set not only contains a cycle, but actually is one. Again, the answer is positive as shown in the next proposition.
Proposition 22. Let A be a contradictory set of rules. It is the case that for all b 2 A;A n fbg is non-contradictory iff A is a simple
>-cycle.
Proof. Right-to-left: if A is a simple >-cycle, then it is obvious that the removal of any of its members will cause A to cease
being a simple >-cycle. By Proposition 20 we obtain that A n fbg for any b 2 A, is non-contradictory.
Left-to-right: assuming that A is a contradictory set of rules, the application of Proposition 20 yields a subset B#A such
that B is a simple >-cycle. If B ¼ A then we are done, so we assume that B  A. By applying Proposition 20 again we obtain
that B is contradictory. The assumption that for all b 2 A;A n fbg is non-contradictory leads us to a contradiction, completing
the proof. h
We are now ready to deﬁne the notion of an argument within our framework. Given that several different conclusions are
possible from a given set of rules A, as is usual in some deduction-based argumentation systems, we will include the desig-
nated conclusion as a component of an argument. In this way, we are able to distinguish between arguments that may have
the same premises but different conclusions. Also, from now on we will be concerned with arguments constructed on the
basis of a designated set of rules. We will denote this ﬁnite set of rules as K.
Deﬁnition 23. An argument is a pair hA;ai, where A is a ﬁnite set of rules (the support of the argument) and a is a rule (the
claim of the argument), such that:
1. A  a (entailment).
2. A is not contradictory (non-contradiction).
3. There is no b 2 A such that A n fbg  a (minimality).The set of all arguments is denoted by A. The set of all arguments whose support is a subset of K is denoted by AK .
Example 8. Recall the set of rules B as in previous examples. We will use this set as the designated set of rules K out of which
all arguments are to be constructed.It should be clear that the following pairs are arguments.hfP ! T3 > T1; P ! T1 > T2g; P ! T3 > T2i
hfP ^ Q ! T2 > T3; :Q ! T2 > T3g; P ! T2 > T3i
hfP ! T1 > T2; :Q ! T2 > T3g; P ^ :Q ! T1 > T3i
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simple -path from T1 to T2, and A ¼
S
S2PS.
Proof. By assumption, A  / ! T1  T2 and therefore, using Theorem 14 we obtain that there is a set P of subsets of Awith
the following property:P ¼ fS#AjS is a simple -path from T1 to T2g
This set P satisﬁes by construction the property that any of each members is a simple -path from T1 to T2. It remains to show
that A ¼ SS2PS. Let A0 ¼ SS2PS, which is obviously a subset of A. By applying Theorem 14 again on P we obtain that
A0  / ! T1  T2. But by assumption, A minimally entails / ! T1  T2 thus it cannot be that A0  A. Therefore A ¼ A0, com-
pleting the proof. h
A valid question is whether our inclusion of the minimality condition in Deﬁnition 23 obviates the requirement for a non-
contradictory support. In other words, if A  a and for all b 2 A it is the case that A n b1a, then can we conclude that A is non-
contradictory? The following example refutes this conjecture.
Example 9. Consider the following set of rules.It should be clear that A is contradictory, since it includes a simple >-cycle ðQ ! T2 > T3;Q ! T3 > T2Þ. Also, it is easy to
see that A  Q ! T1 > T4, and that there is no strict subset B  A such that B  Q ! T1 > T4.
Having deﬁned what an argument is, we naturally come to the issue of what is the complexity of the decision problem of
checking whether a pair A;ah i is an argument. The following result establishes an upper bound, given the upper bound for
rule entailment. We recall that the complexity class Dp3 includes decision problems that can be solved using a polynomial
number of queries to a Pp2 (or, equivalently to a R
p
2) oracle.
Corollary 25. Checking whether hA;ai constitutes an argument is in Dp3.
Proof.
1. We need to check that A  a, which by Proposition 16 is in Pp2.
2. We need to check that A is non-contradictory, a problem which by Proposition 21 is coNP-complete.
3. Finally, we need to check that for any b 2 A;A n fbg 1 a. This can be done by issuing jAj queries to a Pp2 oracle, therefore
this problem is in Dp3. h
We now turn to studying notions of attack between arguments. There are several possible deﬁnitions of attack; we could
deﬁne attack as two arguments having contradictory claims; or we would deﬁne it by expecting one argument to have a
claim that contradicts one of the premises of another argument. We will opt for the latter option which is a more general
notion, and allows for demonstrating a speciﬁc kind of attack commonly called undercutting.
Deﬁnition 26. Let A ¼ hA;ai and B ¼ hB; bi be two arguments. We say that A is an undercut of B iff there exists c 2 B such
that a ﬄ c. In this case we will also say that A undercuts B and that A undercuts B at c.
When hA;ai is an argument and a ﬄ c for some rule c we will also say that A undercuts c. An example of arguments and
undercuts is given next.
Example 10. Recall the set of rules K.K ¼ fP ! T1 > T2; P ^ Q ! T2 > T3; :Q ! T2 > T3; P ! T3 > T1g
We set out below arguments and list the cases where one undercuts another below.A ¼ hfP ! T3 > T1; P ! T1 > T2g; P ! T3 > T2i
B ¼ hfP ^ Q ! T2 > T3; :Q ! T2 > T3g; P ! T2 > T3i
C ¼ hfP ! T1 > T2; :Q ! T2 > T3g; P ^ :Q ! T1 > T3iWe can see that A undercuts B at P ^ Q ! T2 > T3; A undercuts B at :Q ! T2 > T3; A undercuts C at :Q ! T2 > T3; and
that B undercuts neither A nor B.
The complexity of checking whether an argument undercuts another is potentially lower than that of deciding entail-
ment, as the next result demonstrates.
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Proof. Let / be a propositional formula. Let a ¼ / ! T1 > T2 and b ¼! p ! T2 > T1. It is easy to see that A ¼ hfag;ai and
B ¼ hfbg; bi are arguments. Moreover, A undercuts B iff / 0 ?, establishing NP-hardness.
Let a ¼ / ! f be the claim of A, and B the support of B. We give a non-deterministic polynomial-time algorithm for
checking that there exists c 2 B such that a ﬄ c. First, a valuation v of all propositional letters p1; . . . ; pn appearing in a and B
is chosen. A rule c 2 B with c ¼ w ! g is also chosen non-deterministically.2 We check that the valuation v satisﬁes / ^ w,
something that can be done in time polynomial in j/j þ jwj (note that jwj 6 kBk). We ﬁnally check that f ; g are as in Deﬁnition
17, requiring constant time and return the result of the comparison as the answer to the decision problem. This completes the
proof of membership in NP. h
Proposition 20 establishes a relationship between a structural property of a set of rules, i.e., whether it contains a simple
>-cycle, and whether that set is contradictory. Extending this line of enquiry leads us to the question of whether there is a
similar result relating structural properties of an argument A and a claim c, to the fact that A undercuts c. The following
example illustrates such a situation.
Example 11. Recall the set of rules K.2 In fConsider the rule a ¼ P ! T1 > T2 and the following argument.
D ¼ hfP ^ Q ! T2 > T3; :Q ! T2 > T3; P ! T3 > T1g; P ! T2 > T1iIt should be clear that D undercuts a and that its support contains two distinct simple >-paths from T2 to T1, and that, there-
fore, the union of the support of D with fag will contain two distinct simple >-cycles.
So, given an argument hA;ai that undercuts a rule c, the conjecture illustrated in the last example is that a particular rela-
tionship holds between the support A and c, namely that A [ fcgwill consist entirely of simple >-cycles. The following result
veriﬁes this conjecture.
Proposition 28. Let A ¼ hA;ai be an argument and b be a rule such that A undercuts b. Then, there exist a number n P 1 and a
collection of sets of rules fCi#Rji 6 n, such that the following hold:
1. Every Ci is a simple >-cycle, for i 6 n.
2. For any i 6 n, it is the case that b 2 Ci.
3. A [ fbg ¼ Si6nCi.
Proof. We deﬁne fCiji 6 ng to be the set of all simple >-cycles contained in A [ fbg. We need to show that this collection is
non-empty and that it satisﬁes the second and third conditions set above.
To show that the set fCiji 6 ng, as deﬁned, is non-empty it sufﬁces to show that A [ fbg is contradictory, since then
Proposition 20 would assert the existence of at least one simple >-cycle. By assumption, since a ﬄ b, there exist / 2LP and
f ; g 2TF as in Deﬁnition 17 such that a  / ! f and b  / ! g. Since A is an argument, it follows that A  a and therefore
A  / ! f , by the transitivity of . Therefore, A [ fbg is contradictory.
By the assumption that A is an argument, A is non-contradictory and, therefore, by applying Proposition 20, we obtain
that there is no simple >-cycle contained in A. Thus, any simple >-cycle in A [ fbg will have to involve b, and therefore, the
second condition holds.
Suppose a ¼ w ! T1 > T2. Then, b must be of the form v ! T2 > T1 or v ! T1  T2 or v ! T2  T1. Consider the n-
ordered proof tree for a on A obtained through Proposition 13. Every set of rules S used in each application of CTR-nmust be a
simple >-path from T1 to T2, and therefore, S [ fbg is a simple >-path from T1 to T1. In addition, w ^ v is consistent by the
assumption that a ﬄ b, and therefore S [ fbg is a simple >-cycle. When a is of the form w ! T1  T2, we can prove in an
identical manner that S [ fbg is a simple >-cycle.
Let us suppose then that the third condition does not hold, i.e., that there is c 2 A [ fbg such that for all i 6 n; c R Ci. By
the second condition we can conclude that c–b and therefore it must be that c 2 A. But then, by the minimality condition, c
must belong to a simple >-path S#A as above, and therefore c 2 S [ fbg, a contradiction. h
We now turn to the generation of undercuts to a given argument. As usual in argumentation, we may have to consider
different undercuts as somehow equivalent, in that they may be distinct arguments, but differing only in ways that we con-
sider unimportant. The example below demonstrates the redundancy due to varying the claim of an undercut.act, the domain of this choice is not exponential in the size of the problem so this can also be achieved by using disjunction instead of non-determinism.
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The following is obviously an argument in AK , as we have previously seen.B ¼ hfP ^ Q ! T2 > T3;:Q ! T2 > T3g; P ! T2 > T3i
We have also seen how A (shown below) is an undercut of B. The arguments A0 and A00 have the same support as A and also
undercut B at P ^ Q ! T2 > T3. Note that we assume that the languageLP contains the propositional letter R in addition to
those we have used before.A ¼ hfP ! T3 > T1; P ! T1 > T2g; P ! T3 > T2i
A0 ¼ hfP ! T3 > T1; P ! T1 > T2g; P ^ Q ! T3 > T2i
A00 ¼ hfP ! T3 > T1; P ! T1 > T2g; P ^ R ! T3 > T2iAs the above example shows, when we ask the question which are the possible undercuts to a given argument, we can
generate a large number of seemingly redundant arguments which share the same support but have increasingly narrow
patient classes in their claims. Indeed, the number of such arguments will in general be exponential to the number of prop-
ositional letters in LP . Therefore, we would like to single out the most general representative undercuts for a given argu-
ment. We do this with the following deﬁnition and by noting that in the entailment A  a in an argument hA;ai, it is the
specialisation step in the corresponding n-ordered tree that allows for such redundancy.
Deﬁnition 29. Let A ¼ hA;ai be an argument inAK . We will call Amaximally liberal iff there is no argument hA; bi such that
b  a and a 1 b. The set of all maximally liberal arguments within AK will be denoted by ALK .
Note that the only inference rule that can be applied to a single rule is SP. Therefore, if A ¼ hA;/ ! ti is an argument and
A0 ¼ hA;w ! ti is a maximally liberal argument, then it must be that / ‘ w.
Corollary 30. Let A ¼ hA;/ ! T1  T2i be an argument, and letP ¼ fS#AjS is a simple -path from T1 to T2g:
Then A is maximally liberal iff ‘ /() WS2PPCS.
Proof. It should be clear by the construction of the relevant n-ordered proof tree on A that the most general patient class for
the entailed rule is
W
S2PPCS. Thus, it follows from Deﬁnition 29 that if ‘ /()
W
S2PPCS then A must be maximally liberal.
Conversely, if A is maximally liberal then / is the most general patient class, thus ‘ /() WS2PPCS. h
Putting together Proposition 24 and Corollary 30, it is easy to see that given a set P of simple -paths from T1 to T2 there is
only one patient class modulo propositional equivalence such that hSS2PS;ai is a maximally liberal argument, namely
a ¼ WS2PPCS ! T1  T2 (to ensure the minimality of the support we assume that all paths S 2 P have non-equivalent patient
classes). This entails that we can omit the claim of a maximally liberal argument as it can be inferred from the support. For
notational convenience we will at times replace the claim with *.
Our intention, then, is to concentrate our attention only on the maximally liberal undercuts of a given argument, thereby
reducing the redundancy of such a set. But have we addressed all forms of redundancy that exist within the set of undercuts
of an argument? We present a counter-example below.
Example 13. Recall the set of rules K.K ¼ fP ! T1 > T2; P ^ Q ! T2 > T3; :Q ! T2 > T3; P ! T3 > T1g
Consider again the rule P ! T1 > T2 and the argument D.D ¼ hfP ^ Q ! T2 > T3;:Q ! T2 > T3; P ! T3 > T1g; P ! T2 > T1i
D1 ¼ hfP ^ Q ! T2 > T3; P ! T3 > T1g; P ^ Q ! T2 > T1i
D2 ¼ hf:Q ! T2 > T3; P ! T3 > T1g; P ^ :Q ! T2 > T1iWe can see that D, D1 and D2 all undercut the rule P ! T1 > T2, and that they are all maximally liberal. Also, observe that
the supports of D1 and D2 are strict subsets of the support of D. In some sense, D undercuts P ! T1 > T2 in a way that can be
broken down to the ways D1 and D2 undercut P ! T1 > T2. This is because the claim of D is too general and therefore
requires more rules from K.
Following on from the example, the next deﬁnition aims to capture those maximally liberal arguments that have a min-
imal support in order to undercut a particular rule.
Deﬁnition 31. Let A ¼ hA;ai be a maximally liberal argument inALK and let c be a rule. We say that A canonically undercuts
c iff (a) A undercuts c and (b) for any argument hB; bi 2ALK that undercuts c, it is the case that BåA. As usual, we say that A
canonically undercuts B ¼ hB; bi, or that A is a canonically undercut of B iff there exists c 2 B such that A canonically
undercuts c.
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It is easy to see that UK in general is not symmetric nor transitive.
Example 14. Recall the set of rules K.It is easy to see that the canonical undercuts of the rule P ! T1 > T2 are the following.
hfP ^ Q ! T2 > T3; P ! T3 > T1g; P ^ Q ! T2 > T1i
hf:Q ! T2 > T3; P ! T3 > T1g; P ^ :Q ! T2 > T1iOnce again, we see that there is an intuitive link between the structure of canonical undercuts and the rule they canon-
ically undercut. The following result conﬁrms this intuition.
Proposition 32. Let A ¼ hA;ai be an argument inALK and c a rule. Then, A canonically undercuts c iff A [ fcg is a simple >-cycle.
Proof. Right-to-left: on the basis that A [ fcg is a simple >-cycle and the fact that A is an argument, it is easy to show that
a ﬄ c and that, therefore, A undercuts c. Now assume that there is B  A and b 2 R such that hB; bi is inALK and undercuts c.
By applying Proposition 28 we obtain that there must be C#B such that C [ fcg forms a simple >-cycle, a contradiction.
Therefore, A canonically undercuts c.
Left-to-right: let a ¼ / ! T1  T2; c ¼ w ! t and let P be the set of simple -paths from T1 to T2 in A. Clearly, jPj P 1.
From Corollary 30 we know that ‘ / () WS2PPCS, and by assumption / ^ w 0 ?, thus w ^WS2PPCS 0 ?. This means that
there exists Sw 2 P such that PCSw ^ w 0 ?.
Now, assume that jPj > 1. For some S0 2 P, suppose that PCS0 ^ w ‘? is true, and letA0 ¼
[
S2PnfS0g
S
P0 ¼ fS#A0jS is a simple  -path from T1 to T2g
A0 ¼ A0;
_
S2P0
PCS ! T1  T2
* +
:Effectively, A0 is Awithout the rules that exist only in S0 and, as jPj > 1;A0 – ; and P0 – ;. From Corollary 30, it should be clear
that A0 is a maximally liberal argument. By assumption it must be that Sw – S
0, thus Sw 2 P0, therefore
W
S2P0PCS ^ w 0 ?. Thus
A0 is also an undercut of c, contradicting the assumption that A is a canonical undercut of c.
Hence, it must be that PCS ^ w 0 ? for all S 2 P. Note that, as jPj > 1 it is the case that for any S 2 P, S  A. Therefore, for
any S 2 P, using Corollary 30 we obtain that hS; PCSi is a maximally liberal argument that undercuts c, again contradicting the
assumption that A is a canonical undercut of c.
Therefore, it must be that jPj ¼ 1. From Proposition 28 we know that there is at least one simple >-cycle in A [ fcg thus
A [ fcg is a simple >-cycle, completing the proof. h
We can now turn our attention to structures that aggregate arguments and canonical undercuts together, expressing as-
pects of the conﬂict intrinsic within a set of rules. The main such structure we will examine is the argument tree, a structure
that summarises a supporting argument for a particular claim, its canonical undercuts and the canonical undercuts of those,
recursively. To deﬁne this structure we need some auxiliary deﬁnitions ﬁrst. The following one concerns effectively a branch
of an argument tree, and precludes inﬁnite recursion by forcing arguments to use rules in their support that no previous
argument in the branch has used.
Deﬁnition 33. Let hA1;a1i; . . . ; hAn;ani be a sequence of arguments. This sequence is non-repeating iff for every i 6 n it is
the case that Aiå
S
j<iAj.
Before deﬁning argument trees, we quickly recall deﬁnitions relevant to trees in general. Let N be a set, the set of nodes,
and T a binary relation over N. The tuple hN; Ti is called a tree iff T forms a directed acyclic graph such that for all nodes n
there exists at most one nodem such that ðm;nÞ 2 T , and there exists exactly one node nr , the root, such that there is no node
m with ðm;nrÞ 2 T . A sequence of nodes n1; . . . ; nk such that n1 ¼ nr and for any i < k, ðni; niþ1Þ 2 T is called a branch.
Deﬁnition 34. An argument tree is a tuple hN; T; f i where hN; Ti is a tree and f is a function from N to arguments in ALK such
that:
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We will say that an argument tree hN; T; f i supports a rule c iff a  c where f ðnrÞ ¼ hA;ai and nr is the root of the tree.
Example 15. Given the set of rules K,there is the following argument tree supporting P ^ Q ! T1 > T3.
hfP ! T1 > T2; P ^ Q ! T2 > T3g; P ^ Q ! T1 > T3i
"
hfP ^ Q ! T2 > T3; P ! T3 > T1g; P ^ Q ! T2 > T1i
"
hfP ! T1 > T2; :Q ! T2 > T3g; P ^ :Q ! T1 > T3iThe arrows denote that the argument below the arrow is a canonical undercut of the argument above the arrow.
We can see in the example that by its deﬁnition, an argument tree does not need to list all the possible interactions be-
tween the arguments contained in it, nor does it have to contain all arguments that are relevant. The next deﬁnition allows
us to express such a condition.
Deﬁnition 35. An argument tree hN; T; f i is full iff there exists no argument tree hN0; T 0; f 0i such that N  N0; T  T 0 and for all
n 2 N; f ðnÞ ¼ f 0ðnÞ.
Example 16. Recall the set of rules K. For convenience we add labels to the rules, and use the labels in the graph on the right,
instead of the patient classes.Continuing the previous example, the following argument tree supporting P ^ Q ! T1 > T3 is full.In line with the literature on argumentation [19,13], we will deﬁne a notion of defeat which works alongside the notion of
warrant. Such notions allow us to reason about the collective defeat status of a statement that is supported by some argu-
ment from a set of rules.
Deﬁnition 36. A node n in an argument tree hN; T; f i is undefeated (i.e., not defeated) whenever every node m such that
ðn;mÞ 2 T is defeated.
Note that if a node n is a leaf-node, i.e., there is no m such that ðn;mÞ 2 T then n is trivially undefeated.
Example 17. Returning to the last example, the argument tree with markings indicating that a node is defeated (D) or
undefeated (U) is shown below.If the root node of a full argument tree is undefeated means that there exists an argument supporting the claim of the root
node (and its consequences) that survives all attacks from its canonical undercuts, and that therefore, is warranted with re-
spect to the set of rules K. We capture this common deﬁnition of warrant below.
20 N. Gorogiannis et al. / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 51 (2009) 1–22Deﬁnition 37. A rule c is warranted (w.r.t. K) iff there exists a full argument tree hN; T; f i that supports c and whose root
node is undefeated.
In the last example, the root node is undefeated, therefore, the rule supported by the argument tree is warranted. Below
we look at another example.
Example 18. Consider the following graph. For simplicity we omit the exact form of the rules and we simply assume that all
combinations of patient classes are consistent.Let a0 be the rule employing > that is contradictory to a, e.g., a0 ¼ / ! T2 > T1 if a ¼ / ! T1 > T2. There is exactly one full
argument tree supporting a, shown below on the left, and one full argument tree supporting a0, shown below on the right.
Note that here we use the symbol * as a shorthand for the claim of a canonical undercut, since as explained earlier, this can be
deduced on the basis of the start and end treatments, and the patient classes of the support.As can be seen, a is warranted and a0 is not warranted.
Whilst warrant is a useful argumentation-theoretic notion, it is obviously necessary for the medical expert to decide on its
validity in this context. We therefore only propose it as a guide to the user.7. Discussion and conclusions
In summary, we have ﬁrst deﬁned a language that is capable of capturing some of the most important aspects of clinical
study results, and representing those as rules. We then deﬁned the logic hR;i, attempting to model some of the important
ways by which practitioners reason with clinical knowledge. This logic allows the drawing of inferences from sets of rules
that are incomplete and/or inconsistent. We looked at the decision problem of entailment and provided upper bounds for its
worst-case complexity, as well as a characterisation result that can be used as the basis for the construction of theorem-
proving algorithms. To aid in analysing conﬂicting sets of rules, we proceeded to deﬁne an argumentation system on top
of this logic. We looked at structural properties as well as the computational complexity of several relevant decision
problems and examined how concepts from the argumentation literature such as argumentation trees and the notion of
warrant can be used with our approach. We feel that systems built around this approach will be of signiﬁcant value to
practitioners.
We motivated our choice to deﬁne a logic such as hR;i and to use an argumentation approach, in the introduction. Here,
we look at other approaches to similar problems.
There are similarities between the way we formalise the argumentation system here and the approach of [9]. An assump-
tion-based framework (ABF) is a structure consisting of a logic along with a set of formulae called assumptions and a mapping
of formulae to formulae that effectively produces something akin to the negation of its input (its contrary). While there is a
similarity between our approach and ABFs in that we deﬁne a logic that could plausibly be used in an ABF, there are impor-
tant differences. First, as is, the language R does not allow the deﬁnition of a mapping of a formula to its contrary, since the
negation would potentially require a disjunction of rules (e.g., the negation of / ! T1 > T2 would be / ! T2 > T1 or
/ ! T1  T2). Moreover, the deﬁnition of attack in [9] sets the claim of the attacking argument to be the contrary of the
assumption being attacked. This is not appropriate in our approach for the reasons cited earlier regarding the contrary map-
ping, but also due to the way the patient classes interact with each other. For example, given a set of clinical trial results, we
may only be able to prove P ^ Q ! T2 > T1 when attacking P ! T1 > T2, though the former should still be considered a
potentially adequate attack for the latter.
The requirement for transparent reasoning coupled with that for a simple language naturally leads to a monotonic, cred-
ulous logic as we argued in the introduction. A different approach that has been studied in the past, is direct inference, the aim
of which is to somehow assign degrees of belief to statements, given a set of statistical statements such as a set of clinical
trial results. So, for example, the statement ‘‘if patient a takes treatment T1, then a’s disease-free survival will improve”
would be assigned a belief degree based on an interpretation of a set of clinical trial results such as the one we presented
in the introduction. Within this context, [3] represents perhaps one of the most important contributions in this line of
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soning. In addition, practitioners employ clinical knowledge in a very different, non-probabilistic way, thereby making user
acceptance of such a system more difﬁcult.
Other argumentation-based approaches to common-sense reasoning with applications in the medical domain exist, such
as [22] on drug prescription, and [1,11,18,12] on the execution of clinical guidelines. The focus of these approaches is differ-
ent to the one presented here, since they are aimed at capturing medical guidelines directly in their rules while in this paper
we capture clinical trial results as rules. Another obvious difference is that these systems generally rely on ﬁrst-order logic
for representing knowledge, failing therefore to satisfy the requirement for a simple language. Another difference is that in
these approaches there is an implied requirement to manually create the arguments that reﬂect new pieces of information to
be handled by the system, while in our approach this is simpliﬁed to the addition of the new results as additional rules.
Previous work presented in [23] utilised an argumentation system similarly to this paper, and although its adoption of
Defeasible Logic Programming does not allow the use of new inference rules as presented here, we did draw upon its proposed
integration of ontologies with argumentation in our deﬁnition of the language R. Moreover, R allows expressing directly a
superiority result comparing two treatments, i.e., with a treatment comparison formula of the form T1 > T2, whereas in
[23] it was generally assumed that the clinical studies involved would compare a treatment against placebo, or no treatment.
There are several possible avenues for further research. We have used propositional logic to express patient classes for
simplicity and we have already hinted at the possibility for integrating a description logic that is in use with medical ontol-
ogies, an obvious candidate being the underlying logic used in [17]. In addition, it would be interesting to explore extensions
of the language where the treatments are themselves parts of an ontology as well.
Further research is also required with respect to the complexity of some of the decision problems we examined in this
paper. We have provided upper bounds for the worst-case complexity of entailment, one of the most central components
of our framework, placing it within Pp2, a class generally considered intractable. Clearly, a more accurate result regarding
completeness would be desirable, or, otherwise, a proof that the actual complexity is lower. Based on such results, algo-
rithms and heuristics can be sought, as well as an investigation of average-case complexity.
Another important line of research is the investigation of how a practitioner or a patient can express their values. For
example, a doctor may use preferences for expressing that a particular trial is not of adequate statistical power and, there-
fore, its conclusion may not defeat another, more powerful study’s conclusion. Alternatively, a patient at high risk of a ter-
minal cancer may accept strong side-effects that come with a treatment that signiﬁcantly improves their survival
probability. Expressing these values or preferences in our system would greatly improve the usefulness of argumentation.
Finally, from a practical point of view, the utility and usability of our proposal need to be evaluated in a user context. This
will necessitate an implementation of some of the key aspects of the framework, the creation of test cases for use in an eval-
uation study and the recruitment of clinicians other than the one involved in the writing of this paper for participating in the
study. We are now at the planning stages of this work.References
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